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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ERNESTINE B. HARRISON
Plaintiff and Responde:d,
vs.
JACK M. HARRISON,
Defendant and Appellant.

I

ICase
No.
11370

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant submits herewith his Reply Brief for
the reason that Respondent does not come to grips with
the issues as stated by Appellant and it appears that a
further written argument from Appellant will be helpful to the Court.
Respondent at page 3 criticizes the Statement of
Facts of appellant charging him with omitting numerous facts and evidence. Then Respondent proceeds to

1

adduce only evidence favorable to the respondent, point.
ing out no evidence omitted by the appellant in his
statement, and overlooking the fact that in this type
of action the Court shall review all of the evidence.

Stone v. Stone, 19 U. 2d 378, 431 P. 2d 802;
Whitehead v. Whitehead, 16 U. 2d 179, 397 P. 2d 987·
Dearden v. Dearden, 15 U. 2d 105, 388 P. 2d 230;
Steiger v. Steiger, 4 U. 2d 273, 293 P. 2d 418.
)

Respondent makes many mis-statements of evidence and states only one fact not included in the brief
of appellant, namely, the fact that appellant has kept
company with Lorainne Woodland, who was an em·
ployee at the Data Processing Company. Appellant
regards this as immaterial, there being no rule that
when a marriage is destroyed the parties may not seek
companionship elsewhere.

Respondent's tactic in her brief is the same as her
tactic at her second trial, namely, to attack Harrison :
and attempt to make him look deceitful, crafty, and ·
untrue to his wife. She obviously succeeded in trial
court and it is appellant's hope that this Court will
give a dispassionate review of the evidence and the ·
case and not base its decision on whether or not the
Court likes the Appellant.
1

Appellant admits that the marital situation is a
bad one and that feelings are and always have been ·
strong and explosive. The record of the first trial is
not available but Judge Anderson found Appellant to
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be ·aggressive'' (Finding 4, R (}7). Judge Anderson
also was aware of the fact that appellant was keeping
company with Loraine Woodland ( R 67) and with
both aspects of the case before him gave the plaintiff
and the children all they should have by way of divorce
decree.

Respondent's brief is devoted primarily to the
argument that defendant's partnership should be ignored, that the trial judge ignored it and that this
eourt should look through the partnership and treat
this case as though all Data Processing business were
the defendant's personally and that the so called partners are pawns and have no rights and no standing.
The trial court found there was a partnership. (Finding
of Fact No. 6, R (}8) . There was no issue raised in the
.Jlotions to alter and amend the decree that the partnership was a fraud or non-existent. ( R 98 and 104). There
is no finding or conclusion that the partnership was
a fraud or was not a real partnership. Judge Jeppson
rnled that he could not ignore it (R 327 lines 23 to 31)
and yet he did ignore it, in effect, by ordering payments which appellant cannot possibly pay without
jeopardizing the financial welfare of the partnership,
assuming that he could impair the partnership in
an effort to pay the judgment,) and even made an
award of one half of a non-existent account formerly
0wned by the partnership, loaned to Keith Hawkes,
and used completely in constructing a building owned
b.1· the partnership. The Court made no finding as to
the partnership and in her brief respondent ignored
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this completely, without explaining how the partnership can be ignored.
There are issues of law involved herein, requiring
analysis by the Court, and based upon certain fundamentals which appellant does not challenge:
1. The parties are hostile.
2. The defendant does not like to pay taxes if hr
can avoid them honestly.

3. One reason for the partnership is to share earn-

ings with his brother, mother and father. Other reasous
were not explored and were not in issue.
4. Defendant regards partnership matters as in-

cluding a separate entity and that the divorce action
is against him and not the partnership.
Before a second trial judge could modify tht
Decree the following issues must be faced:
I. Did the defendant conceal any assets of himseli
or the partnership?
2. Did the defendant testify falsely?
3. If either one or two is answered affirmatively. ·
and we think they should not be, was there such conduct
as amounted to extrinsic fraud as discussed by this
Court in several decisions?

4. If no relief is available on the issues of fraud
and concealment, an entirely different question is prr-

sented, namely, haYe there been changed circumstanres,
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and if so, what changes in the facts exist in June.
rno8 as compared with December, 19Gu?
Is the decision of the second trial judge a result
uf passion and prejudice against the defendant?
5.

We shall briefly relate the contents of the two
uriefs to these five issues, attempting to avoid repetition.
ARGUMENT
Did the defendant conceal any assets of himself
nr the partnership?
1.

This is covered at pages 32 to 35 of Appellant's
brief. The respondent makes a statement of fact on
this point at pages 16 to 18 of her brief. Respondent
argues these facts as though there were some dispute
about them. The account of $3,094.19 was in evidence
at the first trial and the respondent testified that she
had forgotten it. (R 313). There is no dispute in the
nidence that the partnership had an account of money
which it loaned to Keith Hawkes and recalled so that
the building could be constructed. This plainly appears
in the records of the partnership which were produced
at the trial and there was not one word of testimony
lha l at the time of the first trial there was any false
statement in any of the records with reference to any
of these amounts. And there is not one word of testimony that respondent's attorney, Kenneth Rigtrup,
a~kcd for any records which were not shown to him
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or that he was shown any records which were inaccurate
or tended to conceal any facts.

At Page 18 of her brief just before the argument
Respondent states that the original findings of fact ·
listed in detail all of the assets of the parties with family
savings of $1,600.00 and assumes from this that thes e
were the partnership assets.
0

The first trial judge was not confused. He had
before him the partnership savings account of $3,094.19
(Exhibit P-4) and also the account of $1,600.00 representing family savings as distinguished from partnership assets. (Exhibit P-3). It was one-half of this family
savings which was awarded to the plaintiff, and other
assets of the parties individually consisting of stocks
and bonds and the home were divided one-half to the
plaintiff and approximately one-half to the defendant.
(Conclusions 7 and 9, R 71) . To imply that the
$1,600.00 of family savings should be contrasted with
the partnership accounts of $3,094.00 and $9,729.00
is an egregious affront to the intelligence of the first
trial judge and the entire inquiry of the first trial
which sought to distinguish between partnership prop·
erty and the separate property of the plaintiff and the
defendant.
2. Did the defendant testify falsely?

This is considered in Appellant's Brief, pp. 35-37.
Respondent offers no support in her Brief for the find·
ing of false testimony about income (Finding 4, R 115)

6

except for the unsupported and unsupportable accusation of "defendant's perjured testimony regarding
his income". (Brief, p. 21, line 2).
Defendant gave an "estimate" of income in the
form of Exhibit D-7 at the first trial. There is no evidence of false testimony. The subsequent tax returns
and report to Valley Bank were claims of income by
defendant for specific purposes but his income as a
one-third partner was one-third of the partnership
profit of $23,688.29 for 1966. The actual cash of the
partnership received by him in 1966 was not shown.
(R 246-247)
3. If either 1 or 2 is answered affirmatively, and
we think they should not be, is there such conduct as
arnounts to extrinsic fraud as discussed by this Court?

This matter is discussed in Appellant's brief at
pages 34 and 35 and in Respondent's brief at pages
19 and 20.
Both parties rely on Haner v. Haner, 13 Utah 2d
299, 373 Pac. 2d 577, a portion of which is quoted
by respondent. Respondent argues that the actions of
defendant "were designed and had the effect of depriving plaintiff of the opportunity to litigate the issues in
the divorce action, and a fair trial was effectively prevented." On the contrary, Mr. Rigtrup alleged in his
Amended and Supplemental Complaint:
"Plaintiff is aware of certain assets which the
Defendant has secreted, or diverted to his own
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use, and based upon information and belief
alleges that Defendant has so conducted hi;
financial circumstances in such a fashion that he
should be required to make a complete accounting of all financial transactions which he has
entertained during the marriage, and should be
further required to provide all of his record 1
pertaining to stocks, bonds, bank accounts, sar·
ings accounts, mutual funds, or any other records
relating to his personal financial circumstances,
and should be further required to provide all of
the records pertaining to his business located at
57 East Oakland Avenue, or any other business
venture interest which he has acquired or obtained during the coverture." ( R 3)

It also appears that l\Ir. Rigtrup went to the partnership off ice and examined all of the records he asked
for (R 242) and at that time which was June, 1960,
the partnership savings account was still in the partnership name and was available to }\fr. Rigtrup. Also
available were gross receipts and all accounts of the
partnership business. ( R 245) .
The question discussed in Haner is whether the
alleged conduct "has the effect of depriving the other
party of the opportunity to present his claim or defense.
* * * To prevent them from contesting the issues * * *
preventing the attendance of the parties or witnesses;
or by destroying or secreting evidence * * * ". There
is no suggestion in this record that plaintiff did nut
have a fair trial, did not contest the matter, and there
is no evidence whatsoever that any issue was ,rithhcld
or that there was any evidence destroyed or secreted
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1

Respondent in the second trial charged both fraud
and concealment and change of circumstances. The
evidence was therefore admissible on one issue or the
other and it was not possible to submit this question
on a ruling of evidence.
4. If no relief is available on the issues of fraud

and concealment an entirely different question is presented, na7nely, have there been changed circumstances,
and if so, what changes in the facts exist in June, 1968
as co1npared with December, 1966?

The only reference to this issue in the Findings
of Fact is the last clause of Finding No. 4, which refers
to deliberate misrepresentation of income:
"That in addition thereto Defendant's income
has increased substantially since the time of the
entry of the decree." R ( 115)

1

The Conclusions of Law and the "Judgment and
Amended Decree" ( R 111 - 118) are silent on the matter
of changed circumstances. That is why the matter was
not stressed in Appellant's brief (See pages 30 to 40).
No finding of fact was made to indicate what the Court
believed the income to be and in her brief (Pages 10
and 11) Respondent is equally vague and concludes
that the income from the partnership in 1967 of
$.'35,000.00 all belongs to the Appellant, ignoring the
partnership. (Res. Brief p. 23)
In December, 1966 the estimated income of Appellant was at the rate of $9,000.00 per year. A three way
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split of partnership income for that year would entitle
Appellant to one-third of $23,198.29 (one-third of lim
14 plus line 27 from page 1 of Exhibit P 23).
In 1967 this income increased to one-third of
$34,465.30. (Exhibit P-3)
In June, 1968 there are no accurate figures and
only estimates. Gross !)ales for the first five months of
1967 were $48,146.57 (Exhibit P-9) and gross deposits
in the partnership account for the first five months of I
1968 were $49,034.93 (Page 15 of Respondent's Brief; :
R 258). Appellant testified that business was off and ;
that profits would be down for 1968 (R 217).
Appellant submits that a more critical question is I
whether Appellant had any money available to pay to I
the respondent. In 1967, according to his calculation, :
he paid $9,203.86 for taxes and to the Respondent, '.
leaving him for other uses $2,100.00 (R 237).
He testified that all of his personal spending was
handled through the partnership account as No. 950
( R 194 and 200) and it appears from an examination .
of Exhibit P-5 that some of the payments on alimony :
were listed in account 209.
i

All disbursements of the partnership for 1967 arc ·
shown in Exhibit P 5 totaling $135,642.31. This total
was made up of the $96,000.00 of gross sales, plus the
proceeds of the loan at Valley Bank of $2.t.,OOO.Oil
(R 213) plus about $14,000.00 in savings accounts and
proceeds of other receivables (R 215).
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An analysis of this exhibit shows that the total of
account Nos. 950 and 209 were $10,950.92. Payments
to Ernestine Harrison and to American Savings and
Loan on those two account numbers total $4,851.23
and $1,190.00 or $6,041.23. Payment of taxes was
$1,1177.21 charged to account 950 and payments of
rent on account 950 were $770.00; attorney's fees were
$225.00. It appears that Account 420 was the building
and that payments into that account and to Van Ash
Construction Company totaled $33,055.79 and payments on the land went to Construction Realty in the
amount of $6,249.83.
These figures reconcile very well with Appellant's
testimony and with his statement that there were some
accounts on the building still unpaid (R 214)
Appellant testified that in June, 1968, outstanding
partnership payables were $8,939.83 (Exhibit D 19,
· R 234) and that his personal obligations unpaid were
$5,762.78 (Exhibit D 20, R 235).
1

1

i

The partnership has no cash surplus, the defendant
has no available cash but is being drained of cash by
payments to and for his wife and children under the
original decree. Respondent had no money in June
1968. In December 1966 there were some cash assets
lo he divided.
At pages 12 to H of her brief Respondent argues
that Appellant received some benefits from partnership
expenses which were deductible for tax purposes. It
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is true, for instance, that if the partnership paid part
of the rent because defendant used his apartment as an
office, his living quarters could be better than they
otherwise could be, to an extent which cannot accurately
be determined.
·

1

But these items do not constitute any change of
circumstance; and if defendant receives some benefit
from some items in June, 1968 they are the same as
he received in December of 1966 ..Mr. Rigtrup argued
all of these matters in his .Memorandum to the Court,
thus indicating that these accounts were analyzed by
Mr. Rigtrup and presented to the Court in evidence
(R 135}.
;
In short, the partnership had a better year in 1967
than in 1966, and 1968 appeared to be about the same
as 1967. If it were not for the burden of constructing
the office building defendant undoubtedly would hm
some cash assets and an increase in alimony and support
money might have appeared appropriate. But all things
considered there were no changes in circumstance justifying substantial adjustments of alimony and support.
5. Is the decision of the second trial judge a result

of passion and prejudice against the defendant?
No justification appears in the record for awarding
the house entirely to the respondent rather than onehalf to each, since there were no changed circumstances
with reference to that. No justification appears in the
record for the Court on its own motion ruling that Mr
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I

, Rigtrup should be paid by the defendant for services
rendered in the first trial, the reasonable value of which
Judge Anderson fixed at $650.00 so far as defendant's
responsibility goes.
No justification appears for giving a garnishee
judgment to the plaintiff of partnership funds on deposit
at the Valley Bank and Trust Company and for awarding one-half of partnership savings as they existed in
1966 and were invested in the construction of an office
building in 1967.
The increase of combined alimony and support
money from $375.00 per month to $900.00 per month
when the defendant has no money and owes his creditors
and the plaintiff's living expenses are $571.00 per
month (R 279) plainly indicate that the second trial
judge either was mislead by pretended evidence or
made a decision as a result of passion and prejudice
against the defendant-appellant.
A new trial should have been granted, or else additional evidence required at that time for the purpose
of obtaining accurate evidence on the theory of change
of circumstances since there was not sufficient evidence
to support concealment of assets or false testimony as
lo income, both of which were argued from conjecture,
without presenting the evidence in the record and testimony of Mr. Rigtrup.
Respectfully submitted,
RICHARDS & WATKINS
AND RICHARD L. BIRD, JR.
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